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Abstract. In this paper we investigate experimentally the economic functioning of a wage
tax system for ﬁnancing unemployment beneﬁts in an international economy, in particular in
reaction to budget deﬁcits and tax adjustment. Our results support the hypothesis that due to
out-of-equilibrium price uncertainty producers are reluctant to employ inputs. Wealso observe
a downward pressure on wages exacerbated by an over-supply of labor by consumers. These
observations can explain the budget deﬁcits found. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that tax adjustments
in order to facilitate a balancing of the budget has strong adverse effects on unemployment
and real GDP.
1. Introduction
The problem of persistent budget deﬁcits has been of great concern among
economists since the eighties at least (see e.g. Yellen (1989) and the literature
cited therein). Although there is an ongoing debate on the actual economic
costs of budget deﬁcits, many scholars in economics seem to support the view
that running budget deﬁcits means living at the expense of the future.1 Politi-
cians, however, are often reluctant to increase taxes or decrease expenditures
to close a government budget gap. A well-known example in this respect is
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George Bush’s “Read my lips: no new taxes” statement during his election
campaign for the US presidency in 1988.
Many European countries are still struggling with signiﬁcant budget deﬁ-
cits. The problem becomes more severe as the economic climate gets worse.
In fact, public debt and government budget deﬁcits in Europe increased signi-
ﬁcantly as the economic fair-weather conditions deteriorated in the seventies.
The reluctance of politicians to cut back expenditures and/or increase taxes
made the situation even worse and brought the whole concept of the welfare
state into question. Politicians may fear that policies targeted at cutting de-
ﬁcits will be negatively judged by the voters. In this context, the literature
in political economics has identiﬁed a whole array of politico-institutional
determinants of government budget deﬁcits. Among the models studied are
those based on the assumption of opportunistic policymakers and naïve
voters, models of inter-generational redistribution, and models emphasizing
the effects of budgetary institutions. (For overviews in this domain the inter-
ested reader is referred to e.g. Van Velthoven, Verbon, and van Winden (1993)
and Alesina and Perotti (1995).)
This paper focuses on the tax system used to ﬁnance unemployment
beneﬁts as a potential determinant of budget deﬁcits. In most countries unem-
ployment beneﬁts are ﬁnanced via a tax on labor. This system is maintained
despite the fact that quite a lot of theoretical and empirical work exists ar-
guing that such a system has negative feedback effects on the performance of
an economy.2 However, the standard empirical models used in these studies
are plagued by problems associated with macro-economic ﬁeld data, namely
lack of control and the associated noise in the data. This results in uncer-
tainty about the actual impact of taxation on economic performance and the
government budget (see e.g. Sørenson (1997)). On the other hand, the the-
oretical models that are used have the disadvantage that they rely on strong
assumptions about consumer and ﬁrm behavior, leaving aside the common
simplifying assumption of a representative household. Furthermore, they typ-
ically also focus on equilibria, making it impossible to make statements about
out-of-equilibrium situations, which in reality are rather the rule than the
exception.
In this paper we take a different and new tack to investigate the develop-
ment of budget deﬁcits. We do so ﬁrstly by employing a new methodology
(laboratory experimentation) and, secondly, by exploring a hitherto under-
exposed determinant of the government budget deﬁcit (discussed below),
which sheds a negative light on wage taxation as a means to ﬁnance un-
employment beneﬁts. The present study uses the methodology of laboratory
experiments for the ﬁrst time in this context. Laboratory experiments have
several advantages over an empirical analysis of ﬁeld data and theoretical373
models. In particular, experiments allow one to control the economic envir-
onment and to focus on (relatively) simple cases without having to make
assumptions about behavior. It also allows the study of out-of-equilibrium
states. It opens up the possibility of investigating the dynamics of the be-
havioral adjustment process and facilitates the identiﬁcation of causes and
consequences of individual behavior. These advantages, of course, are not for
free. For example, restrictions have to be made with respect to the complex-
ity of the laboratory economy, since otherwise the experiments may become
too costly or unwieldy. Hence, in our view, experiments focusing on macro-
economic issues are not a substitute for traditional research methods, but may
be a useful complementary tool with its own strengths and limitations.
To be more speciﬁc, in this paper we present the results of an experimental
investigation of the economic functioning of a wage tax system for ﬁnancing
unemployment beneﬁts in an international economy, in particular in reaction
to budget deﬁcits and tax adjustment.3 The international economy consists of
two “countries”, a large and a small one, allowing the investigation of a large
and a (relatively) small open economy simultaneously. Each experimental
session consists of two parts. In the ﬁrst part wage taxes are held constant
at the theoretical (general) equilibrium level. In the second part taxes are
adjusted such that the previous period government budget would have been
balanced.
The experimental method allows us (among other things) to expose a
factor hitherto neglected in (most) theoretical models and empirical studies.
We ﬁnd support for the hypothesis that out-of-equilibrium price uncertainty
affects the behavior of economic agents. Due to uncertainty about prices,
and hence revenues, risk-averse producers are hypothesized to be reluctant
to employ inputs with the additional effect of too low input prices (wages)
and too high output prices. Our results support this hypothesis of a “risk-
compensated price-mechanism”. We also ﬁnd that the downward pressure
on wages is exacerbated by an over-supply of labor by consumers. These
observations can explain the budget deﬁcits we observe in the laboratory
economies in the part where wage taxes are held constant. In the second
part, where taxes are adjusted to previous periods’ deﬁcits, we observe that
the policy of tax adjustment is successful, in the sense that convergence to
a balanced budget is observed. However, this success comes at the cost of
signiﬁcantly increased unemployment rates andsharp decreases in realGDPs,
in both countries. The observed adverse effects on economic performance
may also explain politicians’ reluctance to increase taxes to close budget
gaps. It is important to note that, theoretically, the investigated economies
generate a balanced budget in equilibrium. However, the general equilibrium
model neglects out-of-equilibrium aspects and, therefore, the aforementioned374
“risk-compensated price-mechanism”. Relying solely on general equilibrium
models may, therefore, lead to unexpected budget deﬁcits and disappointing
economic performance. Furthermore, given the “risk-compensated price-
mechanism” it seems plausible that using wage taxes to cover government
budget deﬁcits will make the economic situation worse.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the exper-
imental set-up (including the implementation of the economies and the tax
system in the lab), Section 3 presents and discusses the experimental results,
and Section 4 concludes.
2. Experimental set-up
In this section we describe the economic environment, the tax-beneﬁt system
implemented and the experimental procedures and parameters in more detail.
The main aim of this paper concerns the performance of a wage tax system
to ﬁnance unemployment beneﬁts in an international economy, especially
regarding the development of budget deﬁcits. The choice of the economy
and the tax-beneﬁt system reﬂects not only the wish to parallel “outside-lab”
economies in some fundamental ways but, more particularly, that major parts
of this study were carried out for the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment.
2.1. The economic environment
The implemented economy is best described with the help of the ﬂow dia-
gram in panel (a) in Figure 1. The economy consists of two countries, a small
“home” country and a large “foreign” country. Four goods can be traded in
the economy, capital K and labor L as production inputs and twoconsumption
goods, called X and Y, as production outputs. In each country there are two
types of economic agents, consumers and producers. Consumer preferences
reﬂect a desire to consume X and Y but also to consume leisure. In each trad-
ing period consumers are endowed with some units of labor (L) and capital
(K), but not with X and Y. Consumers can sell their endowments on the input
markets to producers for ﬁat money (“francs”). With these sales proceeds
they can buy X and Y from producers on the output markets. An additional
source of ﬁat money income for consumers is unemployment beneﬁts. For
each unsold unit of their labor endowment they receive an unemployment
beneﬁt w0. In addition, the unsold labor units are counted as leisure (L– L )
from which consumers derive some utility. Consumers’ real-money payoffs
are solely determined by the consumption of leisure, X, and Y.375
Figure 1. Flow diagram of the economic environment (a) and sequence of events (b).
On the input markets producers have to buy inputs L and K from con-
sumers to be able to produce X or Y. After having bought the inputs
production takes place and producers can sell their production goods on the
output markets to consumers in order to make proﬁts. Each producer is either
an X- or an Y-producer and endowed with the relevant production techno-
logy. Producers’ real-money payoffs are solely determined by the proﬁts they
make.
In each country the labor market is local. That is, consumers can sell labor
only to producers (X or Y) located in their own country and producers can
buy labor only from consumers in their own country. The capital market, in
contrast, is international. Each consumer from each country can sell capital
to each producer in their own or the other country, and each producer can buy
capital from each consumer from either country.
On the production side, in each country there is a “sheltered” sector (Y).
That is, Y-producers can sell their products only to consumers from their own376
country, and consumers who want to buy units of Y have to buy them from
their local producers. In contrast, X-producers operate in an “exposed” sector.
That is, good X is tradeable and can be bought by each consumer in either
country from each X-producer in either country.
Both types of producers are endowed with a (decreasing returns to scale)
CES-production function. They differ, however, in two respects. The Y-
technology is relatively labor intensive with a rather small elasticity of
substitution between labor and capital whereas the technology for producers
operating on the exposed X-sector is relatively capital intensive with a higher
substitution elasticity. One may interpret the labor intensive and sheltered Y-
sector as the “service”-sector and the capital intensive and exposed X-sector
as the export orientated “industry”-sector of the economies.4
The economy operates in a sequence of trading periods. Each trading
period is split up into two phases (see panel (b) in Figure 1). In each period,
at the beginning of phase 1 consumers receive their endowments of labor and
capital. In addition, consumers and producers receive some cash to initialize
trade. During the ﬁrst phase the input markets (two local labor markets and
the international capital market) are open. Closing the input markets ends
phase 1. Then there is a short break in which production (automatically) takes
place, and subjects have time to record their sales and purchases. Thereafter,
phase 2 starts with the opening of the output markets (two local markets for
Y and one international market for X). Phase 2 ends after a pre-speciﬁed time
span (or if all goods in question are sold out). A trading period ends with a
break where subjects have time to record their sales and purchases, look at
the trading history, and calculate their payoffs.
2.2. The tax-beneﬁt system
This study investigates an international economy where unemployment bene-
ﬁts are ﬁnanced via a tax on labor. Such wage tax systems are very common,
in particular in Europe. We implement a stylized version that contains all
important aspects of such a system in the laboratory economy. As already
mentioned above consumers receive an unemployment beneﬁt w0 for each
unemployed unit of labor. The government ﬁnances these beneﬁts with the
help of a tax on employed labor to be paid by producers. To be more spe-
ciﬁc, let τwk be the wage tax rate on labor in country k. Then a Z-producer
(Z = X,Y) in country k, denoted jzk, employing Ljzk labor units at a wage wk
has to bear labor costs (1 + τwk)wkLjzk. The total tax burden of producers






Total tax revenues for the government in country k are then simply
τwkwkLk,w h e r eL k := Lxk + Lyk is total employment in country k. On the377
other hand, country k’s government expenditure is given by w0(Lk − Lk),
where Lk denotes the labor force in country k. The condition for a balanced
budget is, therefore, τwkwkLk = w0(Lk − Lk). In reality a balanced budget
may be the exception rather than the rule. Facing a budget deﬁcit or surplus
the government therefore has to adjust its policy if a balanced budget is the
aim. In the economies studied here, this is done by adjusting the wage tax
rate. In particular, if the government faces an unbalanced budget in period t,
itwill adjust the wage tax in period t+ 1such that the budget in period t would
have been balanced with the new tax rate. More formally, the tax adjustment







k = w0(Lk − L
t
k), (2.1)
with an upper limit of 0.9.5
2.3. Parameter choice
The chosen parameter values reﬂect several considerations. They ensure that
in equilibrium traded quantities and relative prices are, on the one hand, suf-
ﬁciently separated and, on the other hand, still in a range such that not too
much time is needed to trade the units subjects wanted to trade. The para-
meter choices also reﬂect the implementation of an international economy
with a small and a large country.6 Table 1 gives an overview of the chosen
experimental parameters.
Preferences and production. As already mentioned, consumers receive
“utility” (Dutch guilders in the experiment) by consuming leisure, X, and
Y. In the table the continuous approximation of the induced consumer prefer-
ences (per period) is shown. (The experimental subjects received a payoff
table.) It is the log-linearized version of a Cobb-Douglas utility function
putting more weight on the consumption goods than on leisure.
Producers are endowed with a CES-production technology (Table 1 shows
the continuous version of the production tables with which subjects in the
role of producers were endowed). Subjects in the role of producers earn their
money by making proﬁts. The proﬁt functions reﬂect the fact that producers
have to pay a proportional tax on labor costs.
Endowments and number of agents. At the beginning of each trading
period, consumers are endowed with L, K, and some initial cash. Producers
do not receive La n dK but some initial cash to start trade. The difference in
size between the two countries is reﬂected by the fact that in the large country
these endowments are seven times as large as in the small country. This dif-
ference in size is also reﬂected in the scaling parameter A of the production
function. Together these parameter values ensure that (theoretical) supply and378
Table 1. Experimental parameters.379
demand for all goods in question is seven times as large in the large country
as in the small country. In all experiments the number of consumers X-, and
Y-producers is the same in both countries.7 Note, that we have at least three
agents on each side of the market, which in other market experiments turned
out to be sufﬁcient to ensure that the markets approximate competitiveness
(see, e.g., Davis and Holt (1993: 150)).
Tax-beneﬁt system. The unemployment beneﬁt w0 an unemployed unit of
labor receives is held constant throughout an experimental session. During
the “constant tax regime” (that is, during the ﬁrst half of an experimental ses-
sion), wage taxes are also held constant, at the rate of the general equilibrium
solution with a balanced budget. During the second half of an experimental
session (“dynamic tax regime”), the taxes are adjusted according to the for-
mula given at the bottom of Table 1 (see also Equation 2.1). The reason for
holding taxes constant in the ﬁrst half of an experimental session is twofold.
Firstly, it gives the economies a sufﬁcient chance to stabilize, and, secondly,
allows to investigate at what level (with respect to, e.g., budget deﬁcits or
surpluses) this happens. Secondly, we are particularly interested in how the
economies behave if the wage tax is adjusted to deﬁcits or surpluses while
keeping all other economic parameters constant. This allows one to isolate the
pure tax adjustment effect on the performance of the economies. It may also
give new insights into the dynamics of the economies if political interference
is necessary or wanted. Therefore, the dynamic tax regime is introduced.
2.4. Experimental procedures
The experiment took place in the CREED laboratory at the University of
Amsterdam. All subjects were undergraduate students, the majority of them
from the Faculty of Economics and Econometrics at the university. They were
recruited by announcing an invitation to participate in a decision-making ex-
periment. Since the experiment was rather complicated, they had to subscribe
to a package of three sessions. This package contained a training session
(where participants learned how to handle the computer and read the tables,
and were acquainted with the trading rules), a “closed economy” session, and
the international economy session.8 Subjects received their earnings only if
they showed up on all three occasions. The parameter values of the “closed
economy” session were similar but not identical to the parameter values of
the experiment reported here. At the beginning of the training session each
subject was randomly assigned the role of a consumer, X-, or Y-producer.9
This role was the same in all sessions in which a subject participated.
At the beginning of an experimental session subjects received the instruc-
tions containing a general part – read aloud by the experimenter – and a type
speciﬁc part – read quietly by the subjects. The instructions also contained380
a questionnaire to ensure that all rules were understood by the subjects.
Trading was not started until everybody had answered all questions cor-
rectly. Participants’ questions were answered privately. They also received
personal history forms containing all information (like endowments, market
restrictions, taxes, subsidies, etc.) relevant to the particular type of economic
agent.10 By requiring subjects to ﬁll in their transactions and earnings, we
intended to make them aware of the consequences of their decisions. All
together we conducted three experimental sessions with the international
economy.11 All sessions were run in October 1998.
Each experimental session consisted of a series of 16 trading periods with
two practice periods at the beginning. Subjects could not earn anything in
these practice periods. Nothing – except subjects’ earnings – was carried over
from period to period. This ensured that each period can be viewed as a one
shot repetition of the same economy. In the ﬁrst eight periods taxes were
held constant at their initial values (constant tax regime). From period nine
onwards taxes were adjusted in accordance withthe adjustment rule described
above in order to facilitate a balancing of the budget (dynamic tax regime). In
each period phase 1 (input markets) lasted 4 minutes and 30 seconds followed
by a short break of 20 seconds. Thereafter, phase 2 started (output markets),
lasting 3 minutes and 30 seconds. This was followed by a 2-minute break
before the next trading period began. Each session lasted approximately 3
hours and 30 minutes. The average earnings (net of show-up fee) per subject
in an international economy session was approximately 67 Dutch guilders.12
In all markets an adapted version of the Plott and Gray (1990) multiple
unit double auction process was used. Each subject was seated in a separate
booth at a computer. The computer screen displayed the highest bid and low-
est ask on each market (where an agent was allowed to trade). At any time
agents had the possibility to look at their own as well as the whole history of
transactions. Furthermore, at the end of each phase they received a summary
statistics of their own transactions (total quantities and average prices) as well
as of all transactions. In the break between phase one and two the producers’
production was automatically calculated by the computer. After phase two
the computer also calculated the agents earnings automatically. At any time
subjects had the possibility to check the computer’s calculations with the help
of their tables.
3. Experimental results
In this section we start out with a brief summary of the general perform-
ance of the economy, followed by an introduction of the statistical technique
used to analyze the main results. The rest of this section is divided into two381
subsections. In the ﬁrst subsection the results for the constant tax regime
will be presented and discussed and in the second subsection those for the
dynamic tax regime. We concentrate on the analysis of the budget deﬁcit
(surplus) and two important indicators for the performance of the economies,
unemployment and real GDP, in the small and in the large country.
From a more general perspective it is, of course, interesting to analyze
the functioning of the economy as a whole and its performance relative to
the theoretical benchmark model. Because of space constraints we will only
give a very brief summary here. (For a more detailed analysis – including a
detailed discussion of the theoretical benchmark model as well as an investig-
ation of the closed economy – we refer the interested reader to Riedl and van
Winden (2000).) An important general result is that we do not ﬁnd any “lack-
of-order”, in the sense that from an economic perspective the input and output
markets respond in the “right” direction.13 Furthermore, we ﬁnd that (in the
constant tax regime) a great majority of the real economic variables (input
and output quantities) exhibit amovement towards the theoretical predictions.
We also ﬁnd, however, that the input (output) prices show a tendency towards
too low (high) values, and that this is accompanied by budget deﬁcits. In the
following we will elaborate on these ﬁndings, and, with respect to prices,
restrict our analysis to (nominal) wages, which are of direct relevance for the
government’s budget.
Before presenting our main results we will brieﬂy introduce a statistical
model that will be used repeatedly in this section. It was originally introduced
and used by Noussair, Plott, and Riezman (1995) and turned out to be very
useful for the investigation of the development of important economic vari-
ables over time. It assumes that, for each experimental session, any particular
dependent variable may have a different initial value but that it will adjust
over time and converge to a common asymptote. More formally, the model
has the following form:
yit = B11D1(1/t)+... +B1iDi(1/t)+... +B1NDN(1/t)+B2(t−1)/t+uit,( 3.1)
where y is the dependent variable in question, i denotes the experimental
session, t the trading period, Di is a session dummy that is equal to 1 for i and
zero otherwise, and uit is an error term. The model allows the dependent vari-
able to have different starting points in different experimental sessions (the
B1i’s account for that) and assumes that the variable converges to a common
value (B2). This model tries to capture the direction of movement as well as
the asymptotic behavior. Note that for low t’s the weight lies on the B1i’s but
that for large t’s the weight is on the common term B2. With this model at
hand we are able to test whether a variable converges to a hypothetical value382
Figure 2. Development of the relative budget surplus.
simply by testing if the estimated coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from
the pre-speciﬁed value. The unit of observation is the value of the dependent
variable per session (i) and period (t). In all regressions standard errors are
corrected for possible heteroscedasticity and AR(1) by using the Newey-West
procedure (Newey and West, 1987).
3.1. The constant tax regime
Figure 2 shows the developments of the relative budget surpluses surk (with
k = s,l indicating the small and the large country, respectively) deﬁned as the
nominal surplus relative to nominal GDP14 (averaged over sessions) for the
constant tax regime (periods one to eight). It clearly shows that a substantial
budget deﬁcit exists in both countries, in all periods. Furthermore, there is
no indication that the deﬁcits become smaller over time. A more thorough
statistical investigation supports this picture. Applying the method introduced
above to the relative surpluses gives,
surs
it =− .118 D1(1/t) −.129 D2(1/t) +.140 D3(1/t) −.093 (t − 1)/t,
(−3.56)( −1.48)( 1.65)( −2.20) (3.2)
surl
it =− .320 D1(1/t) −.176 D2(1/t) +.045 D3(1/t) −.099 (t − 1)/t,
(−4.66)( −8.90)( 0.72)( −4.46) (3.3)
with t-values in parentheses. It shows that both countries start out with a
budget deﬁcit in two out of the three sessions (signiﬁcant in three cases) and383
that in one session both countries exhibit a (not signiﬁcant) budget surplus.
More important, however, the asymptotes are signiﬁcantly negative in both
countries, indicating that in the long run budget deﬁcits are to be expected.
At 9.3 and 9.9% of nominal GDP these deﬁcits are also of economically
signiﬁcant magnitudes. Note, that the reported deﬁcits are not accumulated.
Since nothing carries over from one period to the next the emergence of
budget deﬁcits cannot be (directly) related to unfortunate developments in
earlier periods. This leads to our
Result 1. For the constant tax regime (periods 1 to 8) in both countries
substantial and persistent budget deﬁcits are observed, which do not vanish
over time.
Given this observation it is interesting to investigate the reasons for
these deﬁcits. In the tax-beneﬁt analyzed system unemployed labor units
receive nominally ﬁxed unemployment beneﬁts, which are ﬁnanced by a
proportional tax on the wage sum. Hence, technically, there are two sources
for an observed deﬁcit, given the tax rate: either the unemployment rate
is too high, or nominal wages are too low (or both). We ﬁrst look at the
level and development of unemployment. Figure 3 shows the evolution of
unemployment relative to equilibrium unemployment, in both countries.15
The patterns are suggestive. In the small country unemployment starts close
to the predicted equilibrium unemployment (in the ﬁrst two periods it is even
lower) but shows some tendency to increase over time. In the large country
unemployment is too high in all periods and seems to be relatively stable,
with perhaps a slight tendency to decrease. In the last period of the constant
tax regime, the small and large country exhibit almost the same relative
unemployment rate. The results of the following convergence analysis
(t-values in parentheses) for the relative unemployment rates (uk) are in line
with this ﬁrst impression:
us
it = .010 D1(1/t) +.159 D2(1/t) −.286 D3(1/t) +.059 (t − 1)/t,
(0.21)( 1.26)( −2.28)( 0.97) (3.4)
ul
it = .246 D1(1/t) +.118 D2(1/t) −.160 D3(1/t) +.043 (t − 1)/t,
(2.95)( 2.95)( −1.76)( 1.27) (3.5)
In the small country, initial unemployment is signiﬁcantly lower than
equilibrium unemployment in one session, whereas in the other two sessions
it is (insigniﬁcantly) higher. In the large country, unemployment rates are
signiﬁcantly higher than predicted in two sessions and (insigniﬁcantly) lower384
Figure 3. Development of the unemployment rate.
in the third session at the beginning. In the long run, in both countries,
there is a weak tendency towards too high unemployment rates. Statistically,
however, the estimated long-term unemployment rates are not different from
the equilibrium unemployment rates. The following result summarizes.
Result 2. For the constant tax regime (periods 1 to 8) in both countries,
unemployment converges to equilibrium unemployment from above, in the
sense that the asymptotic (long-term) values, though larger, are statistically
not signiﬁcantly different from the predicted values.
Results 1 and 2 lead to the following
Result 3. In the constant tax regime in both countries, nominal wages
are too low for a balanced budget.
What explanation can be offered for the two observations of too low
nominal wages and the slight tendency towards too low employment
generating the budget deﬁcit? We look ﬁrst at the employment decisions
of producers. We calculate the percentage of cases for which the marginal
revenue product of labor exceeds the gross (after tax) wage, taking the
average current period output price as a measure for the expected output
price. Accounting for errors, a ﬁgure of 50% would seem to be in line with
risk-neutral proﬁt maximizing behavior. To account for possible learning
effects we take the decisions of producers in periods 3 to 8 as the units of385
observation. What we ﬁnd is that the marginal revenue product of labor
exceeds the gross wage in a majority of cases for producers in both countries.
Hence, at given prices producers have a tendency to employ too few labor
units. For producers in the small country this is the case in 59% of all cases
and for producers in the large country in 64% of all cases. Using a binomial
test, it turns out that the observed percentage is signiﬁcantly different from
50% (p = 0.004) for the large country. For the small country it is marginally
signiﬁcant (p = 0.057).
In our view this gives support to the following hypothesis that we will call
the risk-compensated price-mechanism.16 In real economies producers face
a risk when buying inputs. This risk is due to the uncertainty about output
prices and thus the revenues they can make when selling their products on
the output market. The fact that producers face this risk, in combination with
risk-aversion, can explain why they are reluctant to employ “enough” labor
(or factors, in general). Interestingly, there are also some theoretical (partial
equilibrium) studies which support the “risk-compensated price-mechanism”
hypothesis. In particular, Batra and Ullah (1974), Hartman (1975, 1976), and
Holthausen (1976) have shown that price uncertainty indeed reduces factor
demand by risk-averse competitive ﬁrms.
However, thereluctance ofproducers toemploy labor alone cannot explain
the observation of too low nominal wages. To ﬁnd an answer to that we also
have to analyze consumer behavior in more detail. In principle itcould also be
possible that consumers voluntarily supply too little labor. To investigate this
issue we calculate the theoretical labor supply at actually observed prices for
each consumer in each period. It turns out that in comparison to theoretical
supply consumers supply too much labor at given prices. Again looking at
periods 3 to 8 we ﬁnd that in the small (large) country in 78% (100%) of
all cases, actual labor supply exceeds theoretical labor supply at given prices.
These percentages are signiﬁcantly different from 50%, using a binomial test.
In summary, consumers supply too much labor whereas producers
have a tendency to demand too little labor. This has two effects: (i) the
unemployment rate gets an upward thrust, and (ii) labor is in excess supply,
which puts a downward pressure on the nominal wage, the relevant wage for
tax revenues. Using this evidence we have the following
Result 4. Producers’ reluctance to employ labor and consumers’ tendency
to supply too much labor at given prices, driving nominal wages down, can
explain the observed budget deﬁcits.386
Figure 4. Relative budget surpluses and wage tax rates.
3.2. The dynamic tax regime
We now turn to the analysis of the evolution of the economy when taxes
adjust to the previous period budget deﬁcit or surplus. This is of particular
importance since the problem of budget deﬁcits and the political means to
reduce them is on the agenda of many governments. Furthermore, if it turned
outthat ﬁghting deﬁcits makes the economic performance worse, e.g. interms
of unemployment and welfare, this would be an important explanation as to
why it is so difﬁcult to balance the budget without facing political resistance
from various groups in the society.
As in the case of the constant tax regime, we start our analysis with an
investigation of thedevelopment ofthegovernments’ budget surplus. Figure 4
shows the evolution of the relative budget surpluses and the associated wage
taxrates. (Forabetter comparison tothe constant taxregime, thedevelopment
is shown over all 16 periods.) The broken lines indicate the regime change.
Most remarkable is the initially sharp increase in the wage tax rates, which
is due to the budget deﬁcits in the last period of the constant tax regime.
After some further increase the tax rates ﬂatten out and stabilize at a level
approximately twice as high as the initial tax rates. The increased tax rates
are (on average) accompanied by an decrease in the budget deﬁcit. Notably,
the systems do not succeed in balancing the budgets completely. The follow-
ing regression results show, however, that in the long run some convergence
towards balanced budgets takes place.387
surs
it  =− .397 D1(1/t ) +.000 D2(1/t ) −.001 D3(1/t ) −.036 (t  − 1)/t ,
(−12.02)( 0.01)( −0.04)( −1.37)
(3.6)
surl
it  =− .228 D1(1/t ) −.126 D2(1/t ) +.001 D3(1/t ) −.033 (t  − 1)/t ,
(−11.69)( −2.24)( 0.02)( −1.66)
(3.7)
where t  is deﬁned to be t − 8. (Thus, in the above regressions we treat
the ninth trading period, i.e. the ﬁrst in which the taxes are adjusted, as
trading period 1.) In the small (large) country in two (one) out of the three
sessions, the tax adjustment leads initially to a balanced budget, while in one
(two) session(s) the adjustment is not sufﬁcient to balance the budget. The
asymptotic values B2 are still negative (–.036 in the small country and –.033
in the large country) but no longer signiﬁcantly different from zero. Hence,
the regression results indicate that in the long run convergence towards
balanced budgets can be expected. We summarize in
Result 5. For the dynamic tax regime (periods 9 to 16) the budget
deﬁcits converge to zero from below in both countries.
With respect to ﬁghting the budget deﬁcit, the policy to adjust the
wage tax can be judged as successful. The caveat, however, is that rather high
taxes are needed to achieve that goal. To judge the success of that policy in
more general terms of economic performance, we investigate the impact of
the rather high taxes on some measures of economic welfare. Two measures
are taken that are usually seen as important in the political debate but also
in economics: unemployment and real GDP (RGDP).17 We are mostly
interested in the long-term properties of these two measures. Therefore, we
run the convergence regressions for both measures, for the constant as well
as the dynamic tax regime. We then compare the asymptotic values of the
constant tax regime with the asymptotic value of the dynamic tax regime.
This comparison gives an indication of how the economic performance is
inﬂuenced by the tax adjustment policy. The following result is obtained.
Result 6. In the long run the unemployment rates – measured as deviation
from equilibrium unemployment rates – increase from 6 to 12% in the small
country and from 4 to 18% in the large country. Long-term RGDP decreases
by 8% in the small country and by 13% in the large country.
This result shows that the balanced budget is bought at a rather high388
cost in terms of economic performance and welfare. The unemployment
rates increase substantially and the RGDP’s decrease sharply. This result
may – at least partly – explain why it is so difﬁcult to achieve a balanced
budget by adjusting taxes within an unemployment beneﬁt system ﬁnanced
by a wage tax. The decrease in economic performance can be expected not
only to affect some speciﬁc groups in society (like workers) but society at
large, via the decrease in RGDP. This may lead to a broad front of political
resistance, which may be very hard to overcome.
However, the question still remains whether it is the direct effect of
increasing taxes that makes the situation worse. In principle, it could also be
due to behavioral changes because of the mere fact that taxes are adjusted.
The ﬁrst piece of evidence that it is not the latter comes from the fact that
producer and consumer behavior with respect to labor demand and supply,
respectively, in the dynamic tax regime is qualitatively not different from
behavior in the constant tax regime.18 To investigate the tax effect we
look at the correlation between tax rates (in a period) and the sequential
unemployment and RGDP (in the same period). The scatter-plots in Figure 5
show the results.19 They also include the Spearman rank statistics and the
associated p-values. Note that these are controlled observations, since the
tax rates (which are the only parameters that change over periods) are ﬁxed
at the beginning of a period. The ﬁgures and correlation statistics clearly
show that an increase in wage tax rates has strongly negative and highly
signiﬁcant effects on economic performance (unemployment and RGDP), in
both countries. The following result summarizes.
Result 7. Increasing the wage tax rates has strong negative effects on
the performance of the economy in both countries. In both countries, an
increase in the wage tax signiﬁcantly decreases real GDP and signiﬁcantly
increases the unemployment rate.
The negative effects of the analyzed tax-beneﬁt system on the development
of budget deﬁcits and economic performance seems to be due to the
combined effect producers tending to demand too little labor and consumers
supplying too much labor at given prices. This leads to an upward trend of
unemployment rates and a downward pressure on nominal wages. Although
further empirical as well as theoretical evidence is needed to arrive at
deﬁnite conclusions, the results of our study point to an important and
under-exposed determinant of budget deﬁcits and the difﬁculty ﬁghting them
with the help of tax adjustments in the widely employed system of wage tax
ﬁnanced unemployment beneﬁts. If producers are risk-averse and, therefore,
reluctant to employ labor due to the uncertainty about output prices, having389
Figure 5. Correlations between wage tax rate and RGDL (above) and unemployment (below)
in the small country (left) and the large country (right).
to pay taxes up-front seems to exacerbate the negative effects. From this
perspective, it is worthwhile investigating a taxation system where these
negative effects can be avoided.20
4. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented the results of an experiment investigating
the economic functioning of a wage tax as a means to ﬁnance system un-
employment beneﬁts, in particular in response to budget deﬁcits and tax
adjustment. In the experiment, an international economy with a large and
a small country was implemented, allowing the investigation of a large and a
(relatively) small open economy. The results show that the wage tax system
has a strong tendency to produce budget deﬁcits in both countries. These
deﬁcits are driven by the fact that, again in both countries, unemployment
shows some upward trend, whereas nominal wages are too low to cover the390
unemployment beneﬁt outlays with the help of wage taxation. We ﬁnd strong
evidence that consumers tend to supply too much labor, which leads to a
downward pressure on wages. We also ﬁnd support for the so-called “risk-
compensated price-mechanism” hypothesis, which states that producers have
a tendency to employ too few labor units because of risk-aversion and uncer-
tainty about output prices and, hence, revenues at the time they have to make
the employment decision. It is important to note here that, contrary to what is
generally assumed, empirical evidence indicates that there are no differences
between producers (entrepreneurs and managers) and the population at large
as far as risk preferences are concerned (see Brockhaus, 1982).
Furthermore, Gunjal and Legault (1995) show in their empirical study
that ﬁrms may indeed be risk-averse. At any rate, there is no clear empirical
evidence that producers are not risk averse. In relation to this see also Zhang
(1998).
It is shown experimentally that a policy that tries to balance the budget
with wage tax adjustments can be successful in the sense that convergence
to a balanced budget is observed. However, due to the observed behavioral
regularities, this success comes at the cost of reduced economic performance
and welfare. It is shown that, in the long run, balancing the budget leads to a
signiﬁcant increase in unemployment and a signiﬁcant decrease in real GDP,
in the small as well as in the large country. In our view, this offers another
important explanation why it is so difﬁcult to ﬁght budget deﬁcits with the
help of tax policies. Due to the worsening of the economic situation the policy
maker will face a broad front of resistance.
In our study we not only detect negative macro-economic effects of wage
taxation as a means to ﬁnance unemployment beneﬁts but also succeed in
identifying behavioral regularities of producers and consumers which can
explain these effects from a micro-economic perspective. Therefore, it is
worthwhile investigating different taxation systems that may avoid these neg-
ative effects and analyzing whether the observed regularities carry over to
these other systems. In particular, shifting taxation from labor to outputs (via
sales orvalue-added taxes) mayhave positive effects, because insuch systems
the government shares the revenue risk faced by producers. This may weaken
the reluctance of producers to employ labor and may have overall positive
effects.
It is important to notice that the described effects are not captured by gen-
eral equilibrium models. Therefore, solely relying on these models for policy
considerations may lead to wrong predictions and costly political mistakes.
The results presented here also suggest that using experiments for policy is-
sues is an important complementary research tool to theoretical work and the
analysis of ﬁeld data.391
Finally, we want to address a potential criticism concerning the fact that
the tested economies are not closed in the sense that budget deﬁcits are not
ﬁnanced via a bond market. Since the experiment was not designed to include
such a market we can only speculate about the consequences the introduction
of a bond market could have.
With respect tothe small economy wemostprobably expect no large (real)
effects. The reason is that because of the interaction of the economies via the
capital market the impact of the small country on the capital price will be
negligible. However, since in our experiment the large country has the same
problems concerning the budget deﬁcit as the small country, the introduction
of a bond market to ﬁnance the deﬁcits may well affect the capital price. In
light of the fact that – via unemployment beneﬁts – government loans are
used for consumption expenditures crowding-out of productive investment
with negative real effects is likely to result. If so, this would only seem to
exacerbate the observed negative economic effects of the wage tax. However,
we want to stress once more that we can only speculate. A thorough exper-
imental investigation into the effects of an introduction of a bond market to
ﬁnance budget deﬁcits is an interesting research question for future work.
Notes
1. For some inﬂuential studies regarding the effects and costs of budget deﬁcits, see Barro
(1989) and Bernheim (1989).
2. See, among others, European Commission (1994).
3. The research presented is part of a larger research project on the economic effects of
tax systems commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and
initiated via a motion carried by the Dutch Second Chamber of parliament. To the best
of our knowledge, it is the ﬁrst time that policymakers have explicitly asked for advice
with the help of laboratory experiments in a decision making process concerning macro-
economic issues.
4. The implemented elasticities of substitution are actually based on elasticities of substitu-
tion also used in the applied general equilibrium model MIMIC designed for the Dutch
economy by the Central Planning Bureau in The Hague (see e.g. Graaﬂand and de Mooij
(1994)).
5. This upper limit was set in view of an alternative (sales) tax system investigated in van
Winden et al. (1999). Pilot studies showed that tax rates too close to 100% might have a
strong discouraging effect.
6. Given the already complicated nature of the international economy the same currency is
used in both countries.
7. Using the same number of subjects in both countries has two reasons. Firstly, it makes –
with the only exception of size – the two countries completely symmetric. Secondly, the
alternative would have been to increase the number of participants in the large country
instead of the endowments. This would have required a minimum of 64 subjects per
session, which was technically not feasible.392
8. To avoid experimenter-induced effects, the “bids” and “asks” of the experimenters – who
acted as counterparts on the markets during the training sessions – were randomly varied
within a considerable range, which was the same in all training sessions. For the interna-
tional economy sessions subjects were selected on the basis of their performance in the
closed economy session.
9. In the experiment the words “consumer” and “producer” were not used. They were called
“type-I” and “type-II” traders, respectively.
10. The labor market in the small (large) country, the capital market, the X-market, and the
Y-market in the small (large) country were labeled V1 (V2), W1, X1, and Y1 (Y2),
respectively. The unemployment beneﬁt was called a subsidy for unsold units of V.
11. We are aware of the fact that from a statistical point of view, we are at the lower limit with
respect toindependent observations. However, because of theregularitiesobserved inboth
countries, in all sessions, we are quite conﬁdent that the results we found are robust. One
has also to take into account the fact that running such complicated experiments is not
only time intensive (each subject participating in the international economy also had to
participate in the training and closed economy sessions and was, therefore, more than 10
hours in the laboratory altogether) but also very costly (in total the payments for subjects
added up to 14428 Dutch guilders).
12. Each participant in an international economy session also received a show-up fee of 10
Dutch guilders.
13. Regarding the input markets we ﬁnd a positive relationship between the capital-labor
employment ratio and the inverse input price ratio. Regarding the output markets a similar
picture of the relationship between the X-Y consumption ratio and the inverse of the
output price ratio is obtained.
14. Nominal GDP is deﬁned as pxXk + pykYk,w h e r ep x and pyk are the average prices for
Xa n dY k, respectively, and Xk and Yk are the production levels of X and Y in country k,
respectively.
15. Equilibrium unemployment is the unemployment which should be observed if (i) all eco-
nomic agents are rational utility (proﬁt) maximizers, (ii) all markets are in equilibrium,
and (iii) the budget is balanced.
16. A similar mechanism, called the “risk-compensated input/output price-adjustment pro-
cess”, was ﬁrst found by Noussair, Plott, and Riezman (1995) in a different market
experiment with simultaneous input and output markets.
17. For the calculation of RGDP we used the ﬁrst trading period as the base “year”. That is,
nominal GDP of each trading period is weighted by the trading period 1 prices of X and
Yk. We have also run the analysis by taking several other trading periods as the base year.
The results do not change.
18. On the producers’ side the number of cases where they employ too few labor units (i.e.
where the marginal revenue product exceeds the after-tax wage) even shows some tend-
ency to decrease. Using decisions in periods 11 to 16 as units of observation, marginal
revenue product exceeds the gross wage in 53% of all cases in the small country and in
63% of all cases in the large country. For the same periods in the small (large) country
consumers supplied too much labor in 94 (100)% of all cases.
19. As the right-hand sides of the scatter-plots show, the maximum tax rate of 90% is
sometimes obtained.
20. In the study for the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, on which this
paper is partly based, a new sales tax ﬁnanced labor subsidy system was investigated. The
results obtained there point in the direction that shifting taxation from inputs to outputs393
and simultaneously subsidizing labor employment has positive effects on the performance
of an economy.
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